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I. INTRODUCTION
Skeptics of the United States invasion of Panama were appalled at the
lengths to which the United States government went to secure the arrest of an
individual, commonly viewed as the most internationally-prolific "terrorist" in
the world today.' Although there exists wide-spread support for the abduction
and prosecution of terrorists, an underlying clamor arose from disapproving na-
tions, signalling that the United States had gone too far in Panama. Allegations
of senseless aggression and sheer bullying ran rampant with skeptics of the mili-
tary maneuvers pleading for a less subversive attack on terrorism. In light of the
relentless drug infiltration into our borders, frequent hijackings over the high
seas and the random bombing of innocent civilians abroad, though, is such a
limited "war on terrorism"2 plausible? Proponents of the military escalations in
Panama believe it is not.
Fortunately for those skeptical of the appropriateness of the invasion, the
United States Constitution prevents such an unlimited assault. An appropriate
factual microcosm to the roadblocks facing the abduction, prosecution and ex-
tradition s of terrorists may be found in a recent New York district court case.
In Ahmad v. Wigen,4 the accused had allegedly firebombed a passenger bus in
Israel before eventually finding refuge in Venezuela.5 Although Israel had no
extradition treaty with Venezuela, the United States, which had such a treaty,
intervened and circumvented the process by seizing Ahmad, the accused, on a
commercial airliner bound for the United States and brought him to the U.S. to
face extradition proceedings.6 Two important issues arise when the U.S. inter-
venes as such a middleman: (1) What limits are placed on the U.S. in the "ab-
duction" of the alleged terrorist; and (2) what limits are imposed upon the U.S.
in the terrorist's subsequent "extradition?"
Much has been written about the rights of the accused during the abduc-
tion phase.' Controversy has surrounded the Ker-Frisbie doctrine's liberal al-
l. 24,000 U.S. troops were dispatched to Panama in order to capture Manuel Noriega and bring the alleged
ally of South American druglords to justice. Manegold, A Standoff in Panama, NEwswEEK, Jan. 8, 1990, at 28.
For a more thorough analysis of the invasion of Panama, see Nanda, Farer D'Amato and Agora, U.S. Forces in
Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists?: The Validity of United States Intervention in Pan-
ama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 503, 516 (1990).
2. Like his predecessor, President Bush has frequently pledged to continue to wage "war on terrorism." See,
e.g., Krieger, Pan Am 103: Still a Disgrace, Wash. Times, Dec. 26, 1989, at D2 (Bush has called for a "total
war" on terrorism).
3. Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime under the law of one
state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or punishment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 474 at 556-57 (1987).
4. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affid 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990), stay denied, III S. Ct. 23 (1990).
5. Id. at 394.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 COR.NELL L. Rav. 599 (1987); Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists:
When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 447 (1987);
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lowance of abduction at any price.9 More recently, however, this general rule
has come under close constitutional scrutiny and the Toscanino exception 0 is,
perhaps, evidence of a trend to extend the protection of the Constitution, and
the due process clause in particular, to extraterritorial abduction.
Like the abduction phase, and the traditional view that courts do not "in-
quire" into the constitutionality of the actual abduction itself, extradition has
been similarly governed by a general rule of "non-inquiry." Traditionally, U.S.
courts have refused to look into the protections provided the proposed extraditee
in the requesting nation's criminal justice system. Again, like the effect of
United States v. Toscanino on the abduction phase, a body of law has developed
in the extradition arena to temper any injustices and inequities in the general
rule. This Note will focus on the safeguards already available to the potential
extraditee, and will attempt to shed some light on those obstacles in the extradi-
tion phase that hinder, albeit in the preservation of justice, a full-scale, "unlim-
ited" war on terrorism.
First, the role of the executive and judicial branches in extradition will be
addressed to determine if the courts may intervene in this foreign relations mat-
ter, an area usually reserved exclusively for the executive branch. Second, the
continued viability of the general duty of non-inquiry by the extraditing nation
will be established through an analysis of fundamental international principles
of cooperation and comity. The exploration of such a perspective will illustrate
the limited reach of the Constitution to foreign sovereigns. Next, the presenta-
tion of constitutional exceptions to the duty of non-inquiry will be accompanied
by the more specific "specialty" and "double criminality" exceptions. The politi-
cal offense exception, a doctrine of great complexity of which much has been
written, will also be briefly addressed to show its force in denying extradition.
Finally, the boundaries for extraditing the international terrorist will prove
somewhat more expansive when the rights available in criminal proceedings are
distinguished from those available in extradition proceedings. The Note will
conclude with the determination that the constitutional and procedural protec-
tions for the alleged international terrorist are not so "limited" as to offend
traditional and constitutional notions of justice and fundamental fairness, nor so
"great" as to prevent a successful war on terrorism from being waged.
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE IN EXTRADITION
A. The Executive Branch
It is well settled that, as a general rule, the conditions under which a fugi-
tive is to be extradited to a foreign nation are to be determined by the "non-
Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger of Human Rights From Kidnapping of Suspected Ter-
rorists, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 193 (1988).
8. Le., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
9. "[T]he power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction.'" Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. The courts have the
power to try the abducted individual "regardless of how presence was procured." Id. at 520.
10. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (No longer is due process limited to the guaran-
tee of fair procedure at trial; now convictions may not be brought about by methods that offend a sense of justice).
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judicial branches of the Government."'" The legislature commonly confers this
responsibility to the executive through treaty or act of Congress.12 Currently,
besides numerous extradition treaties with foreign nations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184
and 3186 give the executive branch, and the Secretary of State acting as agent
of the executive branch, supervisory power over extradition proceedings., 3 This
power is most likely vested in the executive branch for the simple reason that
the State Department has access to better information and resources than does
the judiciary. In particular, since the State Department has been charged with
undertaking annual reviews of global human rights conditions under the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961,"' it is assumed to be more sensitive to the hard-
ships that may face extraditees once shipped abroad.' 5
B. The Courts
Despite legislative deference to the executive branch in extradition proceed-
ings, the courts of this country have the authority to ensure that the executive
does not exercise this power in a manner that violates "individual constitutional
rights."' 6 The courts should be prepared to take affirmative action in those in-
stances when the executive has overlooked the rights of the accused in its haste
to accomplish some other pressing policy matter.17 The constitutional authority
for such judicial intervention is addressed in the Ahmad opinion:
[T]he courts are not, and cannot be, a rubber stamp for the other branches of govern-
ment in the exercise of extradition jurisdiction. They must, under article III of the
Constitution, exercise their independent judgment in a case or controversy to deter-
mine the propriety of an individual's extradition. The executive may not foreclose the
courts from exercising their responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial
process.' 8
The scope of the courts' authority to intervene in extradition matters, how-
ever, is not clearly defined. Under the traditional rule of non-inquiry, 19 potentialdue process deficiencies in the requesting country would fall within "the exclu-
11. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
12. Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972). See also
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S.
5 (1936).
13. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1979) (The very fact that extradition is
accomplished under treaty indicates that it is most properly considered to be part of the foreign affairs responsibil-
ity of the President.), Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986) ("Extradition is an act of the Executive Branch").
14. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2414 (1990).
15. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D.N.Y., 1989).
16. Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983). See also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
453-54 (1913) ("the constitutional limitation of due process of law prevents the exercise by the executive of the
arbitrary discretion so as to deport the citizen").
17. The procedural device by which the courts block an executive mandated extradition is a writ of habeas
corpus, discussed more fully in Part V.
There is some support for the proposition that in the extradition phase an active judiciary is necessary be-
cause the State Department does a poor job in screening requests for fairness. See Kester, Some Myths of United
States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. LJ. 1441, 1484-89 (1988).
18. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 412.
19. See supra text following note 10.
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sive purview of the executive branch" and courts would defer to the judgment of
the executive branch. 0 Moreover, as a general rule today, the courts should still
rely on the State Department's initial forwarding of the extradition request to
the appropriate U.S. Attorney as assurance that the requesting country may be
relied upon to treat the proposed extraditee fairly and in a manner not inconsis-
tent with general constitutional safeguards. 21
III. THE CUSTOM OF NON-INQUIRY
A. Cooperation and Comity
Writing for the majority in Neely v. Henkel,22 Justice Harlan embraced
the traditional view23 of non-inquiry through an illustration of its adverse im-
pact on those accused of crimes abroad: "When an American citizen commits a
crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to submit to such
modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may pre-
scribe for its own people."' 4
Although the duty of non-inquiry is not applied as dogmatically today as it
was in Neely v. Henkel,25 universally accepted principles of cooperation and
comity point to its continued vitality in today's world. Because no corner of the
globe is immune from terrorist activities, it is in the best interest of all nations
to facilitate the prosecution of these international terrorists by opening extradi-
tion channels despite the ever-present ideological differences which frequently
hinder extradition proceedings. 26 To effectively extradite the international ter-
rorist, many believe that the courts must play a limited role in scrutinizing the
receiving country's judicial system, for "[it is not the business of our courts to
assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of
another sovereign nation. Such an assumption would directly conflict with the
principle of comity upon which extradition is based." 27
Besides the opening of extradition channels, the Seventh Circuit in the case
of In re Assarsson, 8 a recent extradition case, presented a more obvious reason
for increased judicial deference to unfamilar systems abroad:
20. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415. Limitations on the applicability of U.S. constitutional protections abroad
will be developed throughout the Note.
22. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
23. Despite general approval, this "traditional" view has only been around since the mid-nineteenth century
when courts first acquired a role in extradition.
24. Neely, 180 U.S. at 123.
25. Fifty years later, however, in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), the Supreme Court in its decision
to turn over a U.S. soldier to Japan for prosecution, gave no consideration to the procedures that would prevail in
the Japanese courts.
26. The UN General Assembly recognized the need for cooperation among its members in order to fight
terrorism through, inter alia, extradition. G.A. Res. 61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), U.N. Doe. A/40/53, at
301 (1985).
27. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976). See also Matter of
Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981) ("While our courts should
guarantee that all persons on our soil receive due process under our laws, that power does not extend to overseeing
the criminal justice system of other countries.").
28. Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237.
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We [the U.S.] often have difficulty discerning the laws of neighboring States, which
operate in the same legal system as we do; the chance of error is much greater when
we try to construe the law of a country whose legal system is much different from our
own. The possibility of error warns us to be even more cautious of expanding judicial
power over extradition matters.
Whatever the rationale, be it principles of comity or the unfamiliarity of
foreign systems, the United States must act prudently and subtly whenever in-
quiring into the legitimacy of a foreign legal system.
B. The Limited Reach of the Constitution Abroad"0
The question of judicial intervention in extradition proceedings is clearly
one of degree. It is firmly established that in order to go forward with extradi-
tion, the receiving nation's judicial system need not afford the accused the same
constitutional safeguards available to those accused in the United States. 3'
Mere judicial idiosyncracies abroad should not impede extradition proceedings.
For example, in U.S. Bloomfield v. Gengler,3 2 an attempt by the petitioner to
prevent his extradition proved unsuccessful when he asserted that he would be
subject to unconstitutional treatment if shipped to Canada where the law "still
permits appeals by the prosecution from adverse rulings of law with, the further
fillip that the appellate court may enter a conviction in a proper case. '33 Also
illustrative of this principle is the argument that the provisions of the fifth
amendment (that no person shall be held to answer a capital or otherwise infa-
mous crime without a grand jury indictment) and the sixth amendment (requir-
ing the accused to be confronted with witnesses against him) "appl[y] to crimi-
nal prosecutions tried here, and not to persons extradicted [sic] for trial under
treaties with foreign countries whose laws may be entirely different.134
Nevertheless, even with the accused unable to prevent extradition on
grounds that the receiving nation's judicial system fails to comport with the
letter of our Constitution, the Fourth Circuit sardonically argues that "[i]t is
unlikely that extradition would be ordered if. .. the foreign country regularly
opened each day's proceedings with a hundred lashes applied to the back of
each prisoner who did not deny his or her God or conducted routine breakings
on the wheel for every prisoner.13 5 Thus, as a general rule, extradition need only
29. Id. at 1244.
30. For an evaluation of the constitutional safeguards available to the accused in the extradition proceeding
itself, see infra Part V (c).
31. See PROPOSED EXTRADITION AcT OF 1984. H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1984) ("Not
all of the guarantees of American due process must exist in exactly the same form."); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d
77, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (foreign proceedings need not conform to American concepts
of due process); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980) ("[T]he
relator cannot prevent his extradition simply by alleging that the criminal process he will receive fails to accord
with constitutional guarantees.").
32. 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 929. For a more detailed look at similar differences in judicial systems which may or may not block
extradition see the distinction of criminal from extradition proceedings in Part V.
34. Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
35. Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
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follow a simple assurance of "a fair and impartial trial" 36 abroad, not an assur-
ance that all of the procedural safeguards of an American trial will be
available.
IV. EXPANDING PROTECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED EXTRADITEE: EXCEPTIONS
TO THE GENERAL RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
A. Prevention of Extradition to Countries where Fundamental Constitutional
Safeguards are Ignored"7
Despite the fact that both the Constitution and treaties are considered the
"supreme law of the land" in article VI section 2 of the Constitution, it is fun-
damental that when in direct conflict, a treaty must yield to the Constitution.38
Extradition treaties are no exception. It has already been stated that the courts
of this country will protect those individual liberties embodied in the Constitu-
tion.39 It must be emphasized that they will do so even in the face of a valid
extradition treaty (executed in good faith by the other branches of government)
which tends to authorize contrary behavior.
One way to avoid the conflict is to "interpret" the extradition treaty in a
manner consistent with the Constitution, 0 a process labeled in some legal cir-
cles as "judicial braking.""' Another way to circumvent the conflict is to note
changes that have occurred subsequent to the extradition treaty, knowledge of
which, it may be argued, would have prevented an initial agreement between
the two countries in the first place. This attack, however, would most likely need
to be a brainchild of the executive branch. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law [hereinafter Restatement] sets forth that it is in fact the Secre-
tary of State, an agent of the executive, who may refuse to extradite when con-
36. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901). See also Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1215-17 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
37. See Part V for a discussion of the constitutionality of extradition proceedings.
38. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on
the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.").
39. See, e.g., Barr v. United States Dept. of Justice, 819 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1987); Abmad v. Wigen, 726
F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990) ("The
theme that treaties and other international obligations should not inhibit fundamental individual rights policies of
the United States is a powerful one." DUE PROCESS: Another nation may not "use the courts of our coun-
try to obtain power over a fugitive intending to deny that person due process."), Matter of Extradition of Burt,
737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984) (EQUAL PROTECTION: Extradition decisions are to be based "on diplo-
matic considerations without regard to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, sex, national
origin, religion, or political beliefs. ..).
40. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902) (extradition treaties should be faithfully "observed, and
interpreted with a view to fulfill our just obligations to other powers, without sacrificing the legal or constitutional
rights of the accused"); Abmad, 726 F. Supp. at 411 (citing L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTU-
TION 255 (1972)):
Treaty obligations will sometimes need to be read and interpreted by the courts of a nation in the context
of the fundamental law of the nation that entered into them. In the United States that law includes those
principles embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
41. See, e.g., F. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-36 (1950) (construing the letter of statute
narrowly so as not to conflict with common law is another example of "judicial braking").
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ditions "change after an extradition treaty is concluded, and, without formal
denunciation or suspension of the treaty.' 14
The authority of a treaty relative to the Constitution is well settled, but it
was not until 1960 that this distinction was made evident in the extradition
arena. Prior to that point, the rule of non-inquiry had met with little opposition
in judicial opinions. But in Gallina v. Fraser,'43 a case in which a petitioner
claimed that if he was extradited to Italy he would not be granted, inter alia, a
fair trial, the Second Circuit set down the exception to the general rule of non-
inquiry that is still alive today: There can be "imagine[d] situations where the
relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedure or punishment so anti-
pathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require re-examination of the
principle [of non-inquiry]." 44 The decision in Gallina, requiring at least a cur-
sory inquiry into the foreign system awaiting the extraditee, is not only consis-
tent with the Constitution, but is analogous to firmly established common law
doctrines such as the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" which requires the
court to assure itself that the alternative forum is adequate to protect the rights
of the party before implementing the doctrine.
45
There is no formal agenda outlining the scope of judicial review of the
foreign system awaiting the extraditee. Nonetheless, there has been some at-
tempt by Congress to codify the necessary criteria for a fair trial abroad. 46 One
of the more controversial criteria is the right of the accused to be present at
trial.47 The district court in Gallina v. Fraser"8 first adopted the extreme view
that a conviction in absentia "is not contrary to due process of law even where
it appears that the extradition will not be followed by a new trial, but rather by
immediate incarceration."'49 More recently however, there has been support for
the proposition that as a condition of surrender of the accused, "a person found
guilty in absentia" must be retried.50 The Restatement adopts a more prag-
matic, middle-of-the-road view, propounding that a trial in absentia should be
42. RESTATEMENT (TsResD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 477 at 558 (1987) (emphasis added).
43. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
44. Id. at 79.
45. Murty v. Aga Khan, 92 F.R.D. 478, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
46. See PROPOSED EXTRADITION AcT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 998 at 61 (citing Dept. of Defense Directive
5525.1 (Aug. 7, 1979)), in which the House established the following helpful criteria for determining whether the
accused will be subject to a fair trial abroad:
1. No ex post facto law;
2. No bill of attainder;
3. Right to assistance of defense counsel;
4. Right to be present at trial;
5. Right to be confronted by hostile witnesses;
6. Right to a compulsory process to secure witnesses;
7. Burden of proof on the government;
8. Right to trial by an impartial tribunal;
9. Right to be free from self-incrimination;
10. Right to a public trial.
47. Id.
48. 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), affd, 278 F.2d 77, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
49. Id. at 866.
50. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 410 (citing Second Circuit opinion in Gallina which overturned the district
court's liberal interpretation).
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treated as a valid indictment as long as "the record of the proceedings of a trial
in absentia discloses probable cause that the crime charged was committed by
the accused." 5' 1
Because the Gallina exception to the rule of non-inquiry has yet to be in-
voked in its thirty-year existence, it appears obvious that not all constitutional
infringements in foreign judicial systems warrant United States intervention.
For example, the Fourth Circuit in Prushinowski v. Samples52 refused to pre-
vent extradition despite petitioner's claim that his constitutional right to reli-
gious expression would be violated by incarceration in British prisons which re-
fused to cater to strict religious diets.5 3 Moreover, the Prushinowski court found
petitioner's claim that he would, consequently, starve to death, equally without
merit.5 4 Other claims of grossly unconstitutional behavior by the requesting na-
tion have similarly proved futile when brought before the proper extradition
tribunal. 5 The death penalty is the one punitive device which touches off most
of the intervention/consent language in extradition treaties. Many treaties con-
tain a clause that the death penalty will not be invoked without the consent of
the requested nation.56
The Soering Case5 7 not only serves as an example of a country refusing to
extradite because of a potential death penalty sentence, but also offers a valua-
ble lesson in the adverse consequences which may accompany excessive precau-
tion in extradition. In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights found the
character and machinery of the Virginia legal system beyond reproach, but re-
fused to extradite the detainee to the United States because "the very long pe-
riod of time spent on death row in such extreme conditions, with the ever pre-
sent and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty" 58
violates article 3 of the European Convention which mandates: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 59 It
is ironic that the court found fault with the cruelty of the wait, yet found noth-
ing wrong with the execution itself.
While the refusal to extradite in Soering may have been well founded,
though the court in Ahmad argued to the contrary,60 consistent refusals to ex-
tradite are bad for the international extradition system and severely impede the
war on terrorism. Moreover, it would not be surprising to see those same coun-
tries, being denied extradition on constitutional or human rights grounds, recip-
51. RESTATEMENT (TsIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 475 comment h at 562 (1987).
52. Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 1019.
54. Id.
55. See. e.g., Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 419-20 (petitioner failed to demonstrate that if he was convicted in
Israel, his prison service would be so harsh as to be inhumane, despite rumors of batteries, rapes and
overcrowding).
56. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition between the United States and Sweden, 1963, Art. VIII, 14 U.S.T.
1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496, 494 U.N.T.S. 141; Art. IV of U.S. Extradition Treaty, 14 U.S.T. 1845.
57. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1989).
58. Id. at 44.
59. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (1955).
60. See Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 414 (arguing that the Soerlng Case may have gone too far in limiting
extradition based upon probable conditions in the requesting country).
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rocate by refusing to surrender suspected terrorists themselves. For this reason,
judicial scrutiny of systems abroad should be handled in a diplomatic and pru-
dent fashion so as to preserve fairness, while at the same time discouraging
retaliation from abroad.
Once it has finally been determined that the accused is extraditable, and he
is in fact extradited to foreign soil, there is still supporting authority which
argues that the requested nation's role in the protection of the accused has yet
to be exhausted. First, the State Department will assign an American represen-
tative to consult with the extraditee and to observe the prosecution of the case
before, during, and after trial to ensure that "conditions,"6 consistent with
principles of fundamental fairness, are fulfilled. 62 However, despite having a le-
gitimate stake in the fairness of the trial abroad, the United States cannot go so
far as to guarantee "life" as well as liberty. It is the requesting country that has
primary responsibility for protecting the frequently despised extradited terrorist
from assassination." Second, under many extradition treaties, a person extra-
dited to one country may not be subsequently extradited to a third nation to
stand trial for the same act without the consent of the original requested
country. 6'
Finally, it should be pointed out that the number of conflicts involving the
United States Constitution and extradition treaties to which the United States
is a party would be significantly diminished if the United States only entered
such treaties with nations possessing both an ideology and judicial system simi-
lar to its own. According to the Restatement, "Congress and the executive
branch do not enter into extradition treaties with countries in whose criminal
justice system they lack confidence."6 " As evidence of such a policy, the United
States had no extradition treaty with the USSR, People's Republic of China,
North Korea, South Korea, or Iran as of 1986.66 In actuality, however, the
growth of international terrorism and transnational crime has forced the United
States to negotiate bilateral extradition treaties with some countries with ideolo-
gies and legal systems antithetical to those of the United States in order to
secure the return of U.S. fugitives from abroad.7
61. The State Department will set forth the "conditions" by which the accused is to be prosecuted and they
must be agreed to by the requesting nation before an extradition order is authorized.
62. Abmad, 726 F. Supp. at 410 and 419.
63. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
64. REsTATEmENT (TwaRD) OF FOREsoN RELATIONS LAW § 477 comment d at 580 (1986).
65. Id. at 558.
66. Id.
67. See PaoosaD ExTxRiTiON Acr OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1984) for
examples of some of these nations:
1. IRAQ: Iraqis are subject to arbitrary arrest on political or security grounds.
2. TURKEY: The government admitted that 15 persons in government custody had died as a result of
torture.
3. EL SALVADOR: Torture by elements of the Salvadoran armed forces does occur, arrest without war-
rant is permitted, arresting officers are not required to identify themselves.
4. HAITI: Beatings, a traditional practice in Haitian jails, continued in 1982.
5. POLAND: U.S. entered treaty before reforms despite the wide powers of summary arrest and intern-
ment which allow security organ to detain and hold virtually incommunicado for indefinite periods of time
anyone against whom they harbor suspicions.
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B. The Specialty Doctrine
Besides fairness and constitutional impediments to extradition, there also
exist several internationally accepted practices which serve as exceptions to the
general rule of non-inquiry. Under the "specialty doctrine" the extradited party
may not be tried for any crime other than that for which he was surrendered.
For example, in Gallina,68 Italy recognized "that extortion and infliction of seri-
ous bodily injuries are not extraditable crimes," therefore so much of the sen-
tence as applied to those crimes could not be imposed on the relator by Italy."9
As an exception to the specialty doctrine, the extradited party may be tried for
a crime other than that for which he was surrendered if the asylum country
consents.70 The rationale for such an exception stems from the fact that spe-
cialty is merely a "privilege" allotted to the asylum state, and not an inalienable
"right" of the accused.71
The varying ways a charge may be worded in a complaint appear to create
some ambiguities as to the appropriateness of invoking the specialty doctrine to
prevent extradition. The Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky2 clarified
this problem by noting that "the principle of specialty does not impose any limi-
tation on the particulars of the charge so long as it encompasses only the offense
for which extradition was granted. 17 3 For example, the court determined that
the petitioner's extradition charge of "murder" was equivalent to (1) crimes
against the Jews, (2) crimes against humanity, and (3) war crimes (i.e., killing
Jews, civilians and civilians in occupied terrority are all included in the "mur-
der" charge). 4
Finally, it should be noted that the protection provided by the specialty
doctrine does not extend to crimes committed subsequent to the accused's extra-
dition.7 5 Thus, specialty does not preclude prosecution for crimes committed in
the requesting country after the extraditee has been surrendered there. How-
ever, if the extraditee is not charged with the crime for which he was originally
Recent accounts would lead one to believe that the proliferation of U.S. extradition agreements
throughout the world may only be accomplished by ignoring the plethora of human rights violations that
still persist. See, e.g., Wall Street J., Feb. 2, 1990, at A22:
A report prepared for the current session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission lists
49 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America with documented or alleged
cases of torture. . ."Though the fight against torture has considerably intensified during the last
decade, [torture] remains a common phenomenon in today's world."
See also, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 3 ("The State Department criticized China, Nicaragua and Iraq
for human-rights abuses. In an annual report to Congress, the department also documented beheadings in Saudi
Arabia and floggings in Iran .
68. See supra note 11.
69. Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 866 (D. Conn. 1959), affid, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 851 (1960).
70. Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979).
71. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973). "As a matter
of international law, the principle of specialty has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state, designed to
protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right accruing to the accused." As a matter of international law, it
necessarily follows that specialty is also a principle of U.S. law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
72. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
73. Id. at 583.
74. Id.
75. See Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909); Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915).
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extradited to the requesting nation, or if he was tried and was acquitted, the
extraditee "shall have a reasonable time to leave the country before he is ar-
rested upon the charge of any other crime previous to his extradition."76
C. The Double Criminality Doctrine
Under the doctrine of double criminality, extradition does not go forward
unless the acts charged constitute a serious crime punishable under the laws of
both countries.7 The general rule that the acts alleged be criminal in both juris-
dictions is "central to extradition law."78 In Freedman v. United States,79 for
example, extradition of the accused to Canada was denied because neither U.S.
federal nor state laws recognized the crime of commercial bribery for which the
suspect was sought.80 In its opinion, the Georgia district court emphasized that
the charge was not criminal according to the laws of the place where the ac-
cused was "found." 8
Like the specialty doctrine, there are some exceptions to the doctrine of
double criminality. In Freedman, although the court could invoke double crimi-
nality and deny extradition to Canada, the decision to surrender the accused
may have been assigned to the court through the terms of the extradition treaty
itself, thus leaving the extradition decision to the court's discretion.8 2 Further-
more, the Sixth Circuit similarly has held that the mere fact that "the specific
offense charged is not a crime in the United States does not necessarily rule out
extradition."83
Questions of semantics in distinguishing dissimilar classifications of the
same crinie have commonly been resolved pragmatically. Additionally, there is
some support for the proposition that the alleged offenses need not be the same
crime, but need only be criminal. The Second Circuit adopted this rule in
United States v. Stockinger,"8 finding that it was "immaterial that the acts in
question constitute the crime of theft and fraud in Canada and the crime of
larceny in New York State. It is enough if the particular acts charged are crim-
inal in both jurisdictions."88 It is also argued that double criminality does not
prevent extradition if "defenses may be available in the requested state that
would not be available in the requesting state, or that different requirements of
proof are applicable in the two states."88 Stretching the doctrine of double crim-
76. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886).
77. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1922); Brauch v.
Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (Ist Cir. 1980).
78. Brauch, 618 F.2d at 847. See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) ("There is a requirement of 'double criminality' in international extradition cases").
79. 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
80. Id. at 1261, 1262.
81. Id. at 1262.
82. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 300 (1933); Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79 ("[If the extradition
treaty so provides, the U.S. may surrender a fugitive to be prosecuted for acts which are not crimes within the
U.S.").
83. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 581.
84. 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
85. Id. at 687.
86. RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 476 comment d at 569 (1986).
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inality even further, the Demjanjul8 7 court embraced a "universality principle,"
allowing a nation to punish certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, and argued that "some crimes are so universally
condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people . . . [t]herefore
any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to
its law applicable to such offenses."88 Demjanjuk was an alleged Nazi war crim-
inal, and Israel sought his extradition from the United States in order to prose-
cute him under a criminal law authorizing punishment of Nazis.8 9 The court
allowed extradition even though (1) Demjanjuk was charged with committing
these acts in Poland and not Israel; and (2) the state of Israel was not even in
existence at the time Demjanjuk allegedly committed the offenses. °
D. The Political Offenses Exception
Individuals who commit acts of a "political" nature (i.e., in defiance or
attempted overthrow of an existing regime) are generally excepted from extra-
dition. The United States' adoption of the political offenses exception is evi-
denced by its support for the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees9'
which "denies extradition in cases in which it is demonstrated that a fugitive's
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his political opinion. '9 2 A
sufficient exploration of this dynamic doctrine of international law is outside the
scope of this Note. 3 Generally though, an act is deemed "political" for the
purposes of the exception when: (1) there is a violent political disturbance in the
requesting country and (2) the act charged was incidental to this disturbance. 4
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to realize that the exception was
never intended to protect acts of "international terrorism" 95 or political "acts of
destruction whose nature and scope . . . [exceed] human imagination."96
87. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 571.
88. Id. at 582.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577.
92. Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006 (5th Cir. 1971).
93. For a more expansive look at the political offenses exception see, e.g., Banoff & Pyle, To Surrender
Political Offenders: The Political Offense Exception to Extradition In United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L
& Poi'y 169 (1984); Bouffard, Extradition-Political Offense Exception-United States Court Creates New
Definition for Use Against International Terrorists, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 147 (1982); Bury, The Political
Offense Exception in United States Extradition Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 429 (1982); Clark, Political Of-
fenses in Extradition: Time for Judicial Abstention, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 131 (1981); Gilbert,
Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493 (1985); Hannay, Inter-
national Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980);
Malik, Unraveling the Gordian Knot: The United States Law of International Extradition and the Political Of-
fender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 141 (1980); Matsouka, Extradition Law: Applicability of the Political
Offense Exception, 23 HARV. INT'L LJ. 124 (1982); Sternberg & Skelding, State Department Determinations of
Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L 137
(1983).
94. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). See also Wilson v.
Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1953) (U.S. soldier was not protected by political offenses exception, and was consequently
extradited because he was acting outside the scope of official military duty).
95. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
96. Id. at 801.
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V. LIMITING PROTECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED EXTRADITEE: DISTINGUISHING
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FROM EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS
A. Habeas Corpus Review
The proper avenue for an objection to a proposed extradition is habeas
corpus review. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the habeas corpus petition is
deemed the appropriate device for review of the 18 U.S.C. § 3184 hearing and
the adjudication of the claim that the U.S. government's act of extraditing a
given individual is unconstitutional.97 If the court finds in favor of petitioner's
constitutional deprivation claim, then a writ of habeas corpus, staying extradi-
tion, is in order. Despite the blanket statement by the Ahmad court that before
actual extradition, the accused is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to "deter-
mine the nature of treatment probably awaiting petitioner in the requesting na-
tion [and] to determine whether he or she can demonstrate probable exposure to
such treatment as would violate universally accepted principles of human
rights," 98 the extradition statute explicitly reads that "[t]he writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless [hie is in custody in violation of the
Constitution.""9 Thus, claims that do not raise constitutional issues do not trig-
ger habeas corpus review and, consequently, are of no assistance to the accused
who is seeking to stay his extradition.
B. Burden of Proof
Despite the availability of extradition proceedings and, perhaps, habeas
corpus review, the proposed extraditee still must overcome numerous obstacles
heavily favoring cooperation with the requesting nation. The burden of proof is
on the petitioner to show that there is a "substantial probability that he or she
can rebut the presumption of State Department propriety in assuming the fair-
ness of the judicial process in the requesting country." 100 Because a finding of
probability of abuse overrides the language of the extradition treaty, and the
United States faces the possibility that it may be envisioned as in breach of a
prior agreement, the petitioner is required "to demonstrate by 'clear and con-
vincing' evidence that upon extradition he or she will face a lack of due process,
or torture or other cruel or inhuman treatment in the requesting country."101
Finally, extradition will be denied if, after the evidentiary hearing, the court is
satisfied that it is "more probable than not" that the foreign country will treat
the accused unfairly. 10
2
97. See Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Plaster v.
United States, 720 F.2d 340, 349 (4th Cir. 1983); David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983); Matter of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482 (7th Cir. 1984).
98. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410, affd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1977).
100. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415 (citing FED. R. EvID. 301).
101. Id. at 416.
102. Id.
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C. Limited Availability of Constitutional Rights and Defenses
When immersed in a habeas corpus review, the federal courts do not only
assess the substantive constitutionality of the requesting nation's judicial sys-
tem,103 but they also have the authority to consider constitutional defects with
the extradition "procedure" itself.
Just as the trial abroad need not comport exactly with U.S. constitutional
guidelines, the extradition proceeding also does not need to provide the accused
with all the constitutional safeguards available to defendants in purely domestic
criminal trials. First, the fifth and sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has
been held not to be "an appropriate consideration" for extradition proceed-
ings10 4 and should be "limited by its terms to criminal prosecutions." 10 5 Second,
besides the absence of a right to a speedy trial, "it is well established that in the
absence of a treaty provision, the statute of limitations may not be raised as a
defense to extradition proceedings."' 0 6 The Seventh Circuit explained why the
duty of the government to prosecute swiftly does not require it to also extradite
swiftly:
To constrain the government by placing on it the duty to undertake its extradition
decisions with an eye not only towards the legitimate international interest of the
United States . . ., but also toward the prejudice that might result to an individual
accused because of the amount of time that has elapsed, would be to distort the aims
of the diplomatic effort.107
Additionally, although the Restatement provides that there is to be no ex-
tradition "if prosecution in the requesting state would be, or was, in contraven-
tion of an applicable principle of double jeopardy,"'' 08 the Second and Ninth
Circuits have acknowledged that the application of "res judicata" is inappropri-
ate and the only limitation on the number of extradition requests is that each
such request must be based on a good faith determination that extradition is
warranted. 09
D. Limited Availability of Criminal Rights and Defenses
There was at one time support for the general proposition that those facing
extradition procedures were entitled to the same rights and "defences as others
accused of crime within our own jurisdiction.""10 It is widely accepted today,
however, for the simple reason that the extradition proceeding is not a trial of
guilt or innocence, that extradition and criminal proceedings are inherently dif-
103. For an analysis of the applicability of constitutional safeguards to the requesting nation, see supra Part
iv (a).
104. Freedman, 437 F. Supp. at 1265.
105. Jhirad v. Ferradina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
106. Freedman, 437 F. Supp. at 1263.
107. Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487.
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 476(1)(b) at 566 (1986).
109. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1986); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360,
1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
110. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902).
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ferent."' In enforcing an extradition treaty, "the ordinary technicalities of
criminal proceedings are applicable only to a limited extent"11 2 and "form is not
to be insisted on beyond the requirement of safety and justice."'1 3 Conse-
quently, the requesting nation is given an advantage over the party seeking to
block extradition; an advantage "most uncommon to ordinary civil and criminal
litigation."'" 4
The first advantage to the requesting nation is that the accused has no
right to contradict the requesting country's proof or pose questions of credibility
as in an ordinary trial, but only to offer evidence which explains or clarifies the
proof." 5 In light of the absence of a uniform rule of evidence,"" the defenses of
the accused are extremely limited and he may not, for example, introduce evi-
dence to establish alibi or insanity."" Another requirement that assists the re-
questing nation is that 18 U.S.C. § 3190 permits the requesting country to in-
troduce evidence gathered ex parte in the requesting country, while those same
ex parte opportunities of section 3190 are unavailable to the accused. 118 Addi-
tionally, the complaint need not set forth the crime for which the fugitive was
indicted abroad with any particularity," 9 and an authentic copy of the warrant
for arrest is unnecessary. 2 0 Along those same lines, "the actual guilt of the
fugitive does not have to be established, but instead the demanding country
need show only probable cause that he is guilty."''" Finally, the United States
may refuse to withhold extradition for procedural deficiencies if the requesting
nation has sufficient safeguards in place. 2
2
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Note has demonstrated, the constitutional and procedural protec-
tions for the alleged international terrorist who seeks to prohibit extradition
from abroad have evolved in a manner sympathetic to the right of all individu-
als to be afforded fundamental constitutional protections, yet without becoming
overly stringent so as to prevent a successful war on terrorism from being
waged. International cooperation in the extradition arena, accompanied by a
general duty of non-inquiry, will assist in preventing the obstruction of extradi-
tion channels. Moreover, the absence of rigid adherence to constitutional and
111. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963);
Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 900.
112. Grin, 187 U.S. at 184.
113. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
114. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Aristeguieta, 287 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated as moot, 375
U.S. 49 (1963).
115. Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 905.
116. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913).
117. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 287 F.2d at 226-27.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Grin, 187 U.S. at 188-89.
120. Id. at 190.
121. First Natl City Bank of N.Y., 287 F.2d at 227.
122. See, e.g., Magisano v. Locke, 545 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1976) (Circuit court found no need to
protect accused against illegally obtained evidence because "the Canadian statute prohibiting evidence acquired
by illegal wiretapping is essentially the same as that of the U.S.").
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criminal safeguards in the extradition proceeding itself has further facilitated
the use of extradition as an effective weapon in the war on terrorism. To ensure
such a war is waged within the parameters of the Constitution, exceptions to the
general rule of non-inquiry (i.e., the Gallina exception, the double criminality
and specialty doctrines, and the political offense exception) may be invoked to
remedy any deficiencies in justice and fairness.
Skeptics of the safeguards provided the alleged international terrorist prior
to extradition may still find it wholly inappropriate that the same assassin who
has callously destroyed the lives of innocent citizens through random bombings
and gunfire, now is cloaked with such constitutional amenities. Despite these
concerns, it is important to view realistically the constitutional and procedural
impediments to extradition. These safeguards protect the country as a whole
from government usurpations of individual liberties, yet keep the extradition
avenues relatively open. Those further concerned with the inability of the courts
to operate as an effective agent in the war on terrorism should keep in mind the
persistent ambiguities of international law which allow for some judicial discre-
tion in dealing with those heinous terrorists brought before the bench. These
skeptics may take solace in reasoning such as that offerred by the judge in Lin-
nas v. INS,1 23 a deportation case which provides a poignant illustration of the
attitude of many judges when dealing with terrorists already indicted abroad:
The foundation of [the proposed deportation candidate's] due process argument is an
appeal to the court's sense of decency and compassion. Noble words such as "decency"
and "compassion" ring hollow when spoken by a man who ordered the extermination
of innocent men, women and children kneeling at the edge of a mass grave. [Peti-
tioner's] appeal to humanity, a humanity which he has grossly, callously and mon-
strously offended, truly offends this court's sense of decency.12'
Kent Wellington
123. 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
124. Id. at 1032.
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